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Defence Conversion
The Disposal and Demilitarization of Heavy Weapon Systems
1	 Introduction
At the South Eastern Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP)1 
Ministers of Defence meeting in Bucharest on 31 March 2005, the 
Ministers of Defence reaffirmed2 their commitment to enhance 
cooperation and dialogue in SEE, and also with international 
partners, on specific defense conversion related processes.  This 
included an exchange of views on the conversion of redundant 
military facilities.  A necessary precursor to the conversion of 
military facilities is the disposal of the equipment contained 
within those facilities, including heavy weapons.
The Ministers emphasized that the challenges associated with 
defense conversion are an integral part of overall Security Sector 
Reform (SSR) in countries concerned. Defence and Security 
Sector Reform remains a key component for some countries to 
move closer towards the EU and NATO.  The need for increased 
regional cooperation on the destruction of redundant stockpiles 
of major conventional weapon systems was also noted.
The Ministers of Defence also requested that SEESAC provide 
its technical and managerial know-how on weapons destruction 
programs with international support in order to develop national programs for the destruction of surplus military 
weapons and ammunition, with international technical and financial support.  The Regional Arms Control 
Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC)3 has been tasked to act as a regional clearinghouse 
for defence conversion information and has also established three working groups.  SEESAC has produced this 
paper at both the request of the Stability Pact  and the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Preventation and Recovery in 
order to; 1) provide the background information necessary for deeper Stability Pact engagement and support for 
defence conversion in SEE; and 2) as part of the knowledge generation and management process within UNDP 
to assist them in their development of Security Sector Reform strategies.
2	 Background
The conclusion of the Cold War and the emergence of democracy in Central and South Eastern Europe, combined 
with the agreement and implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty,4 resulted in the 
identification of large surpluses of heavy weapon systems.  In Central Europe many countries successfully 
disposed of large stockpiles of these heavy weapon systems,5 but the conflicts of the 1990s in South Eastern 
Europe meant that virtually no stocks were destroyed in the region, (other than during combat operations).
There are potentially significant security and safety risks6 posed by the presence of stockpiles of heavy weapons 
and their associated ammunition and explosives in post-conflict environments, and also those that are surplus 
Heavy Weapons
There is no agreed international definition for the term ‘heavy 
weapons’. For the purposes of this study the term includes:
n	Land Systems
• Main Battle Tanks (MBT)
• Armoured Infantry Fighting vehicles (AIFV)
• Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC)
• Artillery and Heavy Mortars (100mm >)
n	Sea Systems
• Amphibious Landing Ships
• Fast Patrol Craft / Missile Boats
• Mine Warfare Vessels
• Corvettes
• Frigates
• Destroyers
• Submarines
n	Air Systems
• Combat Aircraft
• Helicopters
• Training and Transport Aircraft
Large Surface to Air Missile systems, (such as SAM 2), are considered 
to be ammunition systems for the purposes of this study.
This listing is not intended to be fully comprehensive as 
certain systems may have been excluded. It is designed to be 
representative.
1  http://www.stabilitypact.org/seecp.
2 See text of declaration at http://www.stabilitypact.org/wt3/050331-declaration.pdf.
3 www.racviac.org.
4	Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, 19 November 1990.  (Amended by the Agreement on Adaptation, 19 November 1999).
5	See Section 6 on Previous Experience for further details.
6	See Section 3.1.
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to the new national security requirements of the region.  These risks can adversely affect the local population 
and the environment, and hamper sustainable development.  Additionally, and just as importantly, the possibility 
of uncontrolled proliferation can have a negative impact on the security of neighbouring regions.  Therefore the 
destruction of these stockpiles of heavy weapon systems should be considered as a significant conflict prevention 
measure, a confidence and security building measure as well as being a post conflict human security7 8 issue.  
There is a tendency for donors, implementing agencies and 
other stakeholders to regard weapons and ammunition as one 
task area.  Yet the reality is that the stockpile management and 
destruction of heavy weapons is a relatively straightforward, 
albeit a logistically challenging, task.  The stockpile management 
and destruction of ammunition and explosives requires a much 
more detailed technical response, as the risks and hazards are 
greater than for weapons, and the stockpiles are of a much 
greater logistic scale. The destruction of ammunition falls 
outside the scope of this study, but details can be found in the 
‘Biting the Bullet’ series of publications.9
To date the disposal and demilitarisation of heavy weapons 
systems within South Eastern Europe has been based on a wide 
range of factors, which include:
n	 Compliance with the CFE Treaty limiting the size of national holdings of heavy weapon systems;
n	 Financial and technical resources available to the Ministry of Defence;
n	 Disposal and Demilitarization activities to support armed forces restructuring as part of wider Security Sector 
Reform (SSR);
n	 The political will within the Ministry of Defence to destroy redundant heavy weapon systems.
It is highly unlikely that the international donor community can fund the destruction of all surplus heavy weapons 
systems within South Eastern Europe, let alone the larger stockpiles within Central and Eastern Europe. This 
unfortunate fact means that prioritisation for future demilitarization of some types of heavy weapons10 is 
complicated as the hard priorities of available national and donor resources versus threat should be considered. 
However, recent experience has shown that the disposal of certain heavy weapon types is cost-neutral, or even 
profitable dependent on the price of steel on the local scrap markets.  Immediate international support could 
include:
n	 The destruction of heavy weapon systems that are at greatest risk of proliferation or are ‘attractive’ to warring 
factions;
n	 The capacity building of national institutions to continue the longer-term nationally financed, safe, efficient 
and effective destruction of heavy weapon systems to appropriate technical standards;  
n	 Ensuring the physical security of heavy weapon systems in order to reduce the risks of proliferation until 
Definitions
Disposal
In the context of heavy weapons, the term refers to….. the removal of 
heavy weapons from a stockpile utilising a variety of methods, (that 
may not necessarily involve destruction).
Destruction
The process of final conversion of heavy weapons into an inert state 
that can no longer function as designed.
Demilitarization
The complete range of processes that render weapons, ammunition, 
mines and explosives unfit for their originally intended purpose. 
NOTE:  Demilitarisation not only involves the final destruction 
process, but also includes all of the other transport, storage, 
accounting and pre-processing operations that are equally as 
critical to achieving the final result.  
7 Defined as ‘a concept that challenges the precepts of military security. Instead, democracy, human rights, sustainable development, social 
equity and the elimination of poverty are seen as essential elements of security’. (www.peace.ca/).
8 Also aligns itself with the developing UN concept of ‘freedom from fear and freedom from want’. In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, 
Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the UN Secretary General to the UN General Assembly, 21 March 2005.
9 Biting the Bullet 18 - Ammunition Stocks - Promoting Safe and Secure Storage and Disposal, ISBN: 1898702-63-2, 2005.  Available at 
www.seesac.org.
10 This paper will indicate that the destruction of AFV can be covered by scrap recovery costs. The same may not be true for other systems 
though.
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demilitarization using national resources is possible. (Although the costs of enhanced security at heavy 
weapon storage sites is very likely to be more costly11 than the demilitarization costs).
This paper is designed to highlight some of the factors, risks and hazards due to the presence of large heavy weapon 
stockpiles and the disposal options. It is designed for donors, implementing agencies and other non-technical 
stakeholders; it is certainly not intended to be a technical solution to the challenge, but rather to explain and clarify 
the major issues for all stakeholders.  It must be recognized that stockpile management and demilitarization is a 
national responsibility, and States should not expect the international donor community to fund the destruction 
of their surplus national stockpiles of heavy weapons; the reality is that there are insufficient donor funding 
resources currently available to make more than a small dent in the regional or global stockpiles, and this is 
unlikely to change in the near future.  At this stage it is a case of educating donors, implementing agencies and 
other stakeholders of the real issues, and then developing realistic and safe indigenous capacities, rather than 
expecting an immediate solution.
3	 Heavy	Weapon	Holdings	in	South	Eastern	Europe
3.1	 General
The presence of large stockpiles of heavy weapons within South 
Eastern Europe is an issue that has yet to be comprehensively 
addressed by national governments and the international 
community.  The Stability Pact Defence Conversion initiative is 
one of the first political processes in this arena. There is little 
doubt that the large stockpiles of heavy weapons within the 
region:
n	 Are a significant security risk.  The standards of security at 
the heavy weapon storage locations are of variable quality 
and effectiveness.  Large numbers of personnel are required 
to guard the facilities, and whilst the facilities are required 
to store heavy weapons they are unavailable for conversion 
to civilian use.  SEESAC has recently conducted a Cost Benefit Analysis study to identify the costs of storage 
and security versus destruction for SALW; this methodology can equally be applied to heavy weapons.
n	 Pose a serious obstacle to defence reform and armed forces restructuring.  The presence of the stocks 
necessarily requires large numbers of soldiers to operate, maintain and secure them; hence providing 
justification for retaining large conscript forces.  They are still seen as a strategic national asset by senior 
military officers, rather than the obsolete liability that they undoubtedly are.12
n	 The fuel and ammunition stocks necessary to support the heavy weapons may be an environmental risk. 
Large underground fuel storage tanks that are poorly maintained result in the egress of fuel into the water 
table, whereas the risks from accidental explosions in ammunition storage sites are well documented in 
Biting the Bullet 18.
Identifying accurate data on the exact numbers of heavy weapons within South Eastern Europe has proved to be 
problematic.  Estimates have been obtained from the Institute of International Strategic Studies (IISS) Yearbook 
2004, the OSCE CFE Declaration of Holdings for States and a comprehensive web search.  The figures that follow 
are ‘best estimates’ and should be continually refined as nations are more transparent in the dissemination of 
data.13 
11	Based on experience from the development of the 2005 OSCE Belarus SALW Stockpile Security project.  Security costs will inevitably 
include new fencing, access control points, intruder detection systems etc.  Later in this study information is provided to indicate that 
Demilitarization costs can be significantly offset by scrap recovery costs. 
12 The combat effectiveness of a large proportion of the regional stockpile is highly debatable.  Many of the weapon systems date from the 
1950s to 1970s, and are of little practical use on the modern 21st century battlefield.  The technical performance of similar systems in Iraq 
in 1991 and 2003 is a sound indicator of their obsolescence. 
13 SEESAC has a comprehensive more detailed matrix on Heavy Weapons Holdings in South Eastern Europe. This will be updated on a regular 
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3.2	 Land	Systems
SER COUNTRY MAIN	BATTLE	TANKS	(MBT) AIFV	/	APC14 ARTILLERY REMARKS
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
1 Albania 374 123 938
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 325 312 1387
3 Bulgaria 1474 3001 1758
4 Croatia 289 53 966
5 FYR Macedonia 61 218 305
6 Moldova 0 178 148 As reported to OSCE as of 01 January 2005
7 Romania 1258 2879 1254
8 Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) 962 813 2293
9 TOTALS 4743 7399 8901
3.3	 Naval	Systems
SER COUNTRY
AMPHIBIOUS	
SHIPS
PATROL	VESSELS	
/	CORVETTES
FRIGATES DESTROYERS
MINE	WARFARE	
VESSELS
SUBMARINES
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
1 Albania 0 13 0 0 6 4
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 Bulgaria 2 27 1 0 40 4
4 Croatia 5 8 0 0 1 3
5 FYR Macedonia 0 5 0 0 0 0
6 Moldova 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 Romania 0 45 6 1 23 1
8 Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) 23 31 3 0 20 12
9 TOTALS 30 129 10 1 90 28
14 Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFV) and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC).
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3.4	 Air	Systems
SER COUNTRY COMBAT	AIRCRAFT HELICOPTERS TRANSPORT	/	TRAINING	AIRCRAFT REMARKS
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
1 Albania 58 8 11
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 19 51 5
3 Bulgaria 177 63 70
4 Croatia 54 36 51
5 FYR Macedonia 4 18 5
6 Moldova 0 0 0 Data from OSCE.
7 Romania 604 182 75
8 Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) 293 125 26
9 TOTALS 1209 483 243
4	 Disposal	Options	(Land	and	Air	Systems)
This section of the study will concentrate on the disposal options for Land and Air Systems.  The disposal of Naval 
Systems follows a similar methodology, but further research is necessary.  There are traditionally seven options 
for the disposal of heavy weapons:
n	 Sale
n	 Gift
n	 Use as Training Targets
n	 Deep Sea Dumping
n	 Conversion to Commercial Use
n	 Demilitarization - Dismantling and Recycling
n	 Physical Destruction
4.1	 Sale	or	Gift
The sale or gifting of heavy weapon systems is the most cost effective means of disposal, but there are factors 
that need to be considered:
n	 Any sale or gift should comply with international export control and transfer best practices;
n	 The weapon platforms are very likely to be obsolete or obsolescent and therefore unattractive to a ‘reputable’ 
end user;
n	 The quality of the ammunition and explosives necessary to support the weapons platform is also likely to 
be at the end of its useful shelf life.  The quality will not be as high as newly manufactured ammunition 
and explosives.  This makes it unattractive to reputable end users, as it is highly unlikely to meet their 
performance standards.  Any end user wishing to purchase ammunition of this age should be subject to the 
deepest scrutiny as to why they wish to purchase such ammunition; 
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n	 It is strongly discouraged by much of the international community, as in effect it just transfers the problem 
somewhere else;
n	 Limited sales to ‘military enthusiasts’ are possible, but would represent just a few per cent of the total 
problem, and the financial return would probably only just cover the transportation costs; and
n	 Sales or gifts of heavy weapons (air systems) require that the airframe complies with international aviation 
safety requirements and that the appropriate certification accompanies the aircraft.  Many nations require 
airworthiness certification to standards similar to that of the USA Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) 15 or UK 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).16 Obtaining this certification can be a complex and expensive process that 
eventually costs more than the alternative destruction costs.
4.2	 Use	as	Training	Targets
Surplus heavy weapons (land systems) have often been used as training targets on live firing military ranges. 
Once they have been used as a target for the first time verification in accordance with the CFE Treaty (Section XI 
of the Protocol on Procedures)17 would be necessary to ensure that the appropriate standards for destruction as 
a useable system have been complied with.  It is, however, unlikely that this option would provide a permanent 
solution as; 1) there are more redundant heavy weapons than could realistically be used as targets; and 2) once 
their target use is over there is still a substantial amount of scrap to be processed anyway.  Cost benefit analysis 
(CBA) would probably show that once the full life costs of the ‘target option’ have been established that they are 
no less than the costs of destruction/demilitarization in the short term.
The CFE Treaty also contains provision for the destruction of aircraft as towed targets or drones (Section VI to 
the Protocol on Procedures). Conversion of aircraft for this purpose though is very likely to be more costly than 
destruction or demilitarization by dismantling and recycling.
4.3	 Deep	Sea	Dumping
The dumping of redundant heavy weapon platforms at sea could 
be subject to international agreements 18	 19	 20	as the weapons 
may be considered to be either hazardous or industrial waste; 
a legal interpretation of this is necessary.  Any State adopting 
this approach should expect a very strong negative reaction from 
international environmental groups; an environmental impact 
assessment would be necessary to support this option.
Yet this technique has been successfully used as demonstrated 
by the US Army Reserve deep sea dumping a quantity of M48 and 
M60 MBT off the coast of Florida (June 2001 and June 2004).21 
This project was designed to protect the area from the effects 
15 Details of the USA FAA Airworthiness Certification process can be found at: http://www.faa.gov/licenses_certificates/aircraft_certification/
airworthiness_certification/.
16 Details of the CAA Airworthiness Certification process can be found at:  (http://www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?categoryid=393&pagety
pe=90&pageid=2017).  Certain CAA Airworthiness Certificates will shortly be replaced by the European Aviation Safety Authority (EASE) 
Certificates (http://www.easa.eu.int/home/tc_en.html).
17	Full title is Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reduction of Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the CFE Treaty.  Referred 
to as Protocol on Procedures from this point on.
18	 Oslo Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, February, 1972 and subsequent 
amendments.
19	London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 29 December 1972 and subsequent 
amendments.
20	OSPAR Convention, 1998.
21	http://www.myescambia.com/departments/nesd/documents/ArtificialreeflistJuly05_000.pdf
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of erosion and to develop an artificial reef as a fish havens.  (Escambia County Large Area Artificial Reef Site 
(LAARS)).  The MBT were steam cleaned, had the hazardous materials removed and then had the hatches 
welded open.
4.4	 Conversion	to	Commercial	Use
There is a limited potential for the conversion of a number 
of surplus and redundant land heavy weapon systems to 
commercial use.  This is permitted under the CFE Treaty 
(Section VIII to the Protocol on Procedures).  Suggested uses 
include, among others, mine clearance and flails, non-lethal 
riot control, fire fighting, ice breaking and support to heavy 
civil engineering projects.22	 Regrettably this solution will be 
‘market driven’ and future potential sales are unlikely to 
represent more than a few per cent of the current surplus at 
best.  The resulting systems can be complex, maintenance 
intensive and are expensive to operate.  Companies such as 
VOP 025 in the Czech Republic are well established already 
in this ‘niche’ market, have the market lead and competing 
with them from a ‘start up’ position would be a ‘high risk’ 
strategy unless a firm market was identified and established. 
There are complex heavy engineering issues and significant 
financial investment required for the conversion from tank 
production and maintenance to this particular market.  
4.5	 Demilitarization	-	Dismantling	and	Recycling
The demilitarization option is perhaps the most attractive from a cost recovery and financial perspective as a 
proportion of the operating costs may be offset against the value of scrap recovered.  This technique involves 
the cleaning, dismantling/cutting of the vehicle followed by scrap processing and recycling of the recovered 
materials.  
4.5.1	 Scrap	Metal	Issues
It is apparent that the financial viability of heavy weapon demilitarization is directly related to the value of scrap 
recovered; and consequently the value of scrap on regional or world markets.  Therefore cost effective destruction 
can only take place when the scrap market conditions are favourable, and not necessarily when it is politically 
desirable.  Unless operating costs are covered by the government until the market suggests financial viability, 
then government control over the timing of destruction is weakened.
There is no global central pricing for scrap metal. Prices that can be obtained for a certain kind of scrap metal can 
vary depending on the country as well as on the dealer or recycling facility. Scrap metal prices also depend on the 
grade of the respective metal.  This makes it difficult to accurately estimate the cost recovery that can be expected 
from the sale of scrap metal during demilitarization operations.  The London Metal Exchange (LME)23	average 
official and settlement prices for pure metal are important as these prices act as one of the major aligning factors 
for the scrap metal market. 
22 See the CURRUS Armoured Vehicle Technique Company of Hungary website for further information on this option.  (http://www.currus.
hu/angol/index.html).  Source:  CSRC Report of July 2005.
23	www.lme.co.uk
24 http://euro.recycle.net/exchange/index.html
Fireflighter-55 developed by VOP 025, Novy JIcin s.p. (Czech Republic). 
Based od T55 chassis and has a remote control capability
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An indicator of scrap values within Europe can be obtained from the European Recyclers Exchange (EUX)24	Index. 
This index must, however, be used with caution as the scrap values within South Eastern Europe will undoubtedly 
be much lower.  Although other items such as the optics and communications systems may be recovered for use 
elsewhere, the majority of the vehicles are only worth their scrap value.  
The following matrix estimates the amount of scrap that can be expected to be recovered from a typical Main 
Battle Tank and indicative scrap values:25
SER MATERIAL TONNES	 LME	PURE	METAL	VALUE
26
(US$	PER	TONNE)
SCRAP	VALUE	
(US$	PER	TONNE)27
TOTAL	SCRAP	VALUE	
(US$	PER	TONNE) REMARKS
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
1 Ferrous Metal (Steel) 34.00 118.73 4036.76 Armour.
2 Aluminium Alloy 0.50 1,600 81.65 40.82
From auxiliary 
equipment such 
as stowage bins, 
tool boxes etc.
3 Copper Alloys (Bronze) 0.12 932 199.58 23.95
From bronze 
breech 
components.
4 Lead 0.40 77.11 30.84 From radiation protection.
5 TOTALS 35.02 US$	4132.37
4.5.2	 Metallurgical	Concerns	28
The major metallurgical concern in terms of the value of scrap is that the ‘weapons grade’ steel necessary for 
effective Rolled Homogeneous Armour (RHA) is made by alloying steel with chromium, cobalt, manganese, nickel, 
nobium and other alloying elements.  This results in a high-grade steel, (known as low-alloy steel), as opposed to 
the ‘mild steel’ more often used in commercial manufacturing processes.  Although the low alloy steel required 
for effective RHA is more expensive to initially buy than mild steel, the converse is true when selling as scrap.
In order for a steel foundry to maximise the financial return from the low alloy steel it needs to know exactly 
what alloys and impurities are present in the steel.  This necessitates metallurgical testing prior to processing 
in the foundry, and then refining operations to remove impurities.  The scrap steel from the heavy weapons 
will inevitably be melted at the steel foundry to produce a different type of steel, at which time it is likely to be 
analysed again to determine how its value can be maximised by conversion to a different grade of steel.  After 
melting, the additives of any other necessary alloys and then re-solidification, the resultant material will need to 
go through a combination of cold rolling, hot rolling and annealing processes.  These all come at an operating 
cost to the steel foundry, hence the relatively low market value of scrap steel from heavy weapons.
It is possible to conduct metallurgical testing on the heavy weapon scrap during the dismantling and cutting 
operation, but as the steel foundry will undoubtedly test the metal during processing these costs could possibly 
be wasted.  The difference in prices between the various steels may not produce the economies of scale to make 
on-site metallurgical testing financially viable.
25 There is very limited open source information on the exact quantities of material that are used in the production of heavy weapons.  The 
only source SEESAC could find was Utilization of Hardware - Options and Constraints. The NVA Case, Hans-Joachim Gießmann in Conversion: 
Opportunities for Development and Environment, Anke Brunn, Lutz Baehr und Hans-Jürgen Karpe (Eds.), Berlin/Heidelberg, 1992. Cited in 
Großes Aufräumen nach dem Wettrüsten, Michael Renner in Zur Lage der Welt - 1994, Lester R. Brown (Eds.), Frankfurt au Main,1994.
26 LME Cash Mean Price (September 2005). 
27 Based on scrap values obtained from EUX on 19 November 2005.  (Less than Truck Load (LTL) (<40,000 lbs) prices taken as worst case). 
Market fluctuations and transport costs cannot be accounted for.
28 Information obtained from discussions with Alistair Doig, Consultant Metallurgist, Cranfield University, UK.
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What is certainly apparent is that, prior to contracting the demilitarization of significant quantities of heavy 
weapons, the contracting authority should take professional advice from an independent metallurgical and 
scrap metal consultant in order to ensure that the cost recovery from the scrap steel can be maximised. Market 
fluctuations, steel quality and cutting processes will all have an impact on the value of recovered scrap.
4.5.3	 Demilitarization	Flow	Process
The demilitarization process phases for land systems are at Annex A.
4.6	 Financial	Modelling
Some financial modelling was conducted as part of the research for the CSRC paper during which some major 
assumptions on economies of scale (5,000 vehicles), scrap recovery value Euro 100 per tonne) and time period 
(5 years) were made.  The results suggested that the costs of demilitarization were in the order of Euro 2,550 
per vehicle and after offsetting the costs of scrap recovery a profit margin of 11% was yielded.  Regrettably 
SEESAC was not provided with access to the model as it is only available to the NATO Technical Advisory Group. 
SEESAC have developed financial models for SALW Destruction and these are currently been amended for Heavy 
Weapons and will be available in November 2005.
4.7	 Physical	Destruction
Physical destruction by explosive detonation appears at first site to be a practicable option.  The procedures 
appear at first sight to be simple, relatively low cost and well-established procedures for destruction and 
verification exist (Annex B). Yet there are environmental hazards from fuels, lubricants, isotopes, battery acids 
and hydraulic fluids.  Any environmentally responsible destruction by detonation methodology would require that 
these hazards were addressed before the explosive charges were laid and detonated.
Once the heavy weapon system has been destroyed by detonation, then the problem of scrap recovery still exists 
unless the destroyed vehicle is to be left at the destruction site in permanence. Assuming it is not, then the costs 
of dealing with the scrap should be approximately the same as the costs of the Demilitarization option; but the 
value of the scrap is likely to be slightly lower due to its condition after detonation!  Full cost benefit analysis 
should be conducted before this option is selected, and the costs compared to that of demilitarization.
4.8	 Summary	of	Disposal	Options
This matrix summarises the various disposal options:
DISPOSAL	OPTION FACTORS
Sale or Gift Proliferation risks
Unattractive to 
reputable End 
User
Compliance with 
international 
arms export ‘best 
practices’
Limited sales 
to ‘military 
enthusiasts’
Training Targets Limited market Environmental impact
Final scrap 
disposal costs
Final scrap value 
can be reduced
Deep Sea Dumping
Legal Status 
of technique 
requires 
resolution.
Reaction of 
environmental 
lobby
No local deep 
sea dump sites.  
Long sea voyage 
required.
Artificial Reefs
Coastal Defences
Moorings
Conversion to Commercial Use Engineering complexity
Market driven
Limited market
High initial 
investment 
required
High risk strategy
Demilitarization - Dismantling and 
Recycling
Technique is 
simple
Maximise cost 
recovery through 
scrap sale
Economies of 
scale apply
Can draw on 
experience of 
Central Europe
Destruction Apparently simple
Environmental 
factors
Final scrap 
disposal costs
Final scrap value 
can be reduced
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5	 Regional	or	National	Strategies
South Eastern Europe is fortunate in that it can; 1) draw on the experience of Central Europe in the demilitarization 
of heavy weapons; 2) has the necessary technology to ensure the demilitarization of these systems; and 3) 
justify their destruction as part of ongoing defence reform processes that are necessary for further euro-atlantic 
integration.  The fundamental challenges remain those of national political will, inertia within Ministries of 
Defence and a lack of immediately available financial resources.  
International donor assistance will be required to initiate worthwhile demilitarization initiatives, as States have 
other more pressing problems to resolve than the demilitarization of redundant military equipment.  Examples 
are high unemployment, stabilization of the emerging democratic processes, the rebuilding of old failing 
manufacturing industries, environmental cleanup, the development of new economic opportunities etc.  Defence 
reform and demilitarization, whilst important from the perspective of the Minister of Defence, is not yet a priority 
for the Minister of Finance, and therefore very limited national funding will continue to be available to support 
the demobilization of heavy weapons.
Regional political will is necessary, and cooperation during demilitarization operations to achieve ‘balanced 
disarmament’ is necessary, but the economies of scale suggest that national programmes in the majority of 
states is a cost effective option.  Regional cooperation on ‘lessons learned’, effective demilitarization techniques 
and financial models will also be necessary.
Financial support from international organizations for the demilitarization of heavy weapons is also limited.  The 
NATO PfP Trust Fund does not yet extend to heavy weapons, the OSCE do not have a document or policy to support 
the demilitarization of heavy weapons and UNDP have yet to develop a strategy concerning defence conversion 
as part of their Security Sector Reform (SSR) portfolio.  International NGOs such as the Bonn International 
Center for Conversion (BICC) and the Geneva based Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) 
have engaged in the wider issue of defence conversion, but neither has the technical knowledge or project 
management experience to engage effectively at the operational level of demilitarization. 
NATO – as the Task Force leader of the Stability Pact Initiative on Defence Conversion - focuses on the monitoring 
of programmes concerning:
n	 The retraining of redundant military personnel; and
n	 The conversion of military sites in SEE countries.
NATO also coordinates and contacts international organizations dealing with conversion issues in South Eastern 
Europe.  The recent decision to merging NATO experience and the Stability Pact’s facilitating role in the conversion 
process offers increased potential for coordination and the exchange of information. The Stability Pact and NATO 
are seeking to mobilise financial support from such international financial institutions as the EU PHARE29 and 
CARDS30 programmes, CEDB,31 EBRD,32 EIB,33 World Bank, EU Small Business Charter and interested bilateral 
donors.
29 The PHARE programme is one of the three pre-accession instruments financed by the European Union to assist the applicant countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe in their preparations for joining the European Union.  (Bulgaria and Romania). (http://europa.eu.int/comm/
enlargement/pas/phare/).
30	Community Assistance for Reconstruction Development and Stability in the Balkans.  (Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, FYR Macedonia and SCG). 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/cards/index_en.htm).
31 Council of Europe Development Bank. (http://www.coebank.org/homeen.htm).
32 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  (http://www.ebrd.com/).
33 European Investment Bank.  (http://www.eib.org/).
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6	 Previous	Experience34
The experience of the Visegrad countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and 
Slovakia), which are well-advanced in their SSR programmes, will be important to SEE decision-makers as they 
approach the defence conversion task in their countries.
6.1	 Czech	Republic
The Czech Republic outsourced the demilitarization by dismantling and recycling of their surplus heavy weapons 
(land systems) to a commercial company VOP 025, Novy Jicin s.p.35 At the NATO Advanced Research Workshop 
(No 0980919) (October 2004 and February 2005) the following data was presented:
n	 Vehicle Preparation  - 120 Man Hours
n	 Vehicle Cutting  -  40 Man Hours
n	 Destruction Rate  - 50 Vehicles per Month
n	 Destruction Costs  - US$ 2,000 per Vehicle36
6.2	 Hungary
Hungary also outsourced the demilitarization by dismantling and recycling of their surplus heavy weapons (land 
systems) to a commercial contractor, Currus RT, albeit a joint stock company with a majority shareholding by the 
government.  Currus RT has conducted the demilitarization of heavy weapons under the terms of the CFE Treaty 
and is a CFE registered reduction site.  Key points raised by Hungary included:
n	 Heavy Weapon Systems Destroyed (1992 - 2004) - 2,358
n	 Heavy Weapon Systems taken by ‘Enthusiasts’  - 1.4%
n	 Destruction Costs     - US$ 2,000 - US$ 4,000 per Vehicle
6.3	 Montenegro
As part of the Montenegro Demilitarization (MONDEM) 
programme, the Government of Montenegro took advantage 
of local high scrap prices (EURO 173 per tonne) to outsource 
the destruction of 61 MBT (and other systems) to the local 
steel foundary.  The contract stipulated that the steel foundary 
was responsible for cutting of the tanks at their base locations 
and then transporting the steel for reprocessing at the steel 
foundary.  This project is ongoing (September 2007) and it 
is estimated that it will raise approximately EURO 350,000, 
which the Government of Montenegro is then donating to the 
UNDP/OSCE MONDEM programme to cover some of the costs 
of ammunition demilitarization.  
34	Source:  ‘The Disposal of Redundant Heavy Weapons’, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the UK, July 2005, (ISBN 
1-905058-29-2).
35	http://www.vop025.cz/php/index_podnik_gb.php3?action=kontaktni_adresa
36	It was not clear whether this was before or after the scrap recovery costs were accounted for.
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6.4	 Moldova	(2001)
The OSCE provided technical and financial report to the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF) in 
Transdniestra for the destruction of a range of MBT and ACV between 27 August and 30 Novermber 2001.  The 
following were destroyed at an average cost of US$ 978 per item.  
SER ITEM QUANTITY REMARKS
(A) (B) (c) (D)
1 MBT T-64 108
Destroyed in accordance with CFE Treaty by severing with oxy-acetylene.
Total Costs = US$ 226,000
2 ACV BMP-1 10
3 ACV BTR-60 15
4 ACV BTR-70 66
5 Artillery D-30 2
6 Mortar 2S-12 16
7 MLRS BM-21 14
8 TOTALS 231
The programme continued on a lesser scale from June 2002 to September 2003.
7	 Conclusions	and	Recommendations
n	 Full transparency on heavy weapon holdings and likely surpluses after defence reform is necessary in 
order that the full scale of the problem can be identified.  States should be encouraged to provide more 
transparency in the provision of the data necessary to estimate the financial aspects of demilitarization.  The 
heavy weapons holdings in the SEESAC matrix should be validated by national governments.  Without this it 
is difficult to prepare a tangible case for international donor support.
n	 Demilitarization by Dismantling and Recycling should be the preferred disposal option for the majority 
of heavy weapon systems.  The market for conversion to civilian use is very limited and strong competition 
already exists.  Sale is a proliferation risk and reputable end users are rare.  The risks of diversion to the 
‘grey’ and then ‘black’ markets are real.
n	 The financial viability of Demilitarization is dependent totally on the cost recovery possible from scrap 
sales.  A full analysis of the regional scrap market, combined with a detailed analysis of the exact types, 
grades and quantities of scrap that can be recovered by vehicle type is necessary for accurate financial 
modelling; and hence realistic project development.
n	 International donor financial support may be necessary to initiate national demilitarization programmes. 
The financial modelling will determine whether these will be necessary in the form of loans from international 
financial institutions (when operations are potentially profitable) or grants (where operations have a financial 
shortfall after cost recovery from scrap).  
n	 There is a range of prior practical experience within Central and South Eastern Europe on the 
demilitarization of heavy weapons. States embarking on a heavy weapon destruction programme should 
consult with other States to identify ‘best practices’ in order to maximise cost recovery and thereby minimise 
the financial exposure and risks to the State.
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Annex A - Phases of Heavy Weapon (Land Systems) 
Demilitarization Process 
PHASE PROCESS REMARKS
Pre-Preparation Phase
Hazard Inspection Identify and mark all hazardous materials and components for removal.
Remove Ammunition, Explosives and Explosive 
Reactive Armour (ERA)
Remove all Radiac and Radioactive Sources
Preparation Phase
Drain Fuels
Drain Hydraulic Fluids
Remove Batteries Possibly recyclable.
Degauss Fuel Tanks To ensure safety during cutting operations.
Dismantling Phase
Remove Exterior Components Aluminium storage bins etc.
Unship Turret MBT and AIFV only.
Cutting Operations Oxy-Acetylene 
Scrap Processing
Segregate Scrap by Type Ferrous, Non-ferrous and Rare Metals
Pack Scrap into Containers Waste Skips, Rail Flats or ISO Containers. 
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Annex B - Extract from CFE Treaty
PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND 
EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE
The States Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty as 
set forth in Article VIII of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.
SECTION I.  GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REDUCTION
1.  Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be reduced in accordance with the procedures set forth in this 
Protocol and the other protocols listed in Article VIII, paragraph 1 of the Treaty. Any one of such procedures shall be deemed sufficient, 
when conducted in accordance with the provisions of Article VIII of the Treaty or this Protocol, to carry out reduction.
2.  Each State Party shall have the right to use any technological means it deems appropriate to implement the procedures for reducing 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty.
3.  Each State Party shall have the right to remove, retain and use those components and parts of conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty which are not themselves subject to reduction in accordance with the provisions of Section II of this Protocol, and 
to dispose of debris.
4.  Unless otherwise provided for in this Protocol, conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall be reduced so as to 
preclude their further use or restoration for military purposes.
5.  After entry into force of the Treaty, additional procedures for reduction may be proposed by any State Party. Such proposals shall 
be communicated to all other States Parties and shall provide the details of such procedures in the same format as the procedures 
set forth in this Protocol. Any such procedures shall be deemed sufficient to carry out the reduction of conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty upon a decision to that effect by the Joint Consultative Group.
SECTION II.  STANDARDS FOR PRESENTATION AT REDUCTION SITES
1.  Each item of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty which is to be reduced shall be presented at a reduction site. 
Each such item shall consist, at a minimum, of the following parts and elements:
(A)  For battle tanks: the hull, turret and integral main armament. For the purposes of this Protocol, an integral main armament of a 
battle tank shall be deemed to include the gun tube, breech system, trunnions and trunnion mounts;
(B)  For armoured combat vehicles: the hull, turret and integral main armament, if any. For the purposes of this Protocol, an integral 
main armament of an armoured combat vehicle shall be deemed to include the gun tube, breech system, trunnions and trunnion 
mounts. For the purposes of this Protocol, an integral main armament shall be deemed not to include machine guns of less than 
20 millimetre calibre, all of which may be salvaged;
(C)  For artillery: the tube, breech system, cradle including trunnions and trunnion mounts, trails, if any; or launcher tubes or launcher 
rails and their bases; or mortar tubes and their base plates. In the case of self-propelled pieces of artillery, the vehicle hull and 
turret, if any, shall also be presented;
(D)  For combat aircraft: the fuselage; and
(E)  For attack helicopters: the fuselage, including the transmission mounting area.
2.  In each case, the item presented at the reduction site in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Section shall consist of a complete 
assembly.
3.  Parts and elements of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty not specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, as 
well as parts and elements which are not affected by reduction under the procedures of this Protocol, including the turrets of armoured 
personnel carriers equipped only with machine guns, may be disposed of as the State Party undertaking the reduction decides.
SECTION III. PROCEDURES FOR REDUCTION OF BATTLE TANKS BY DESTRUCTION
1.  Each State Party shall have the right to choose any one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries out the destruction of 
battle tanks at reduction sites.
2.  Procedure for destruction by severing:
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(A)  Removal of special equipment from the chassis, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of on-board 
armament systems;
(B)  Removal of the turret, if any;
(C)  For the gun breech system, either:
(1)  Welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; or
(2)  Cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block;
(D)  Severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring;
(E)  Severing of either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount in the turret;
(F)  Severing of two sections from the perimeter of the hull turret aperture, each constituting a portion of a sector with an angle 
of no less than 60 degrees and, at a minimum, 200 millimetres in radial axis, centred on the longitudinal axis of the vehicle; 
and
(G)  Severing of sections from both sides of the hull which include the final drive apertures, by vertical and horizontal cuts in 
the side plates and diagonal cuts in the deck or belly plates and front or rear plates, so that the final drive apertures are 
contained in the severed portions.
3.  Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition:
(A)  Hull, hatches and cornerplates shall be open to maximise venting;
(B)  An explosive charge shall be placed inside the gun tube where the trunnions connect to the gun mount or cradle;
(C)  An explosive charge shall be placed on the outside of the hull between the second and third road wheels, or between the third and 
fourth road wheels in a six road wheel configuration, avoiding natural weaknesses such as welds or escape hatches. The charge 
must be located within the radius of the turret casting. A second charge shall be placed on the inside of the hull on the same side 
of the tank, offset and opposite to the external charge;
(D)  An explosive charge shall be placed on the inside of the turret casting in the area of the main armament mounting; and
(E)  All charges shall be fired simultaneously so that the main hull and turret are cracked and distorted; the breech block is stripped 
from the gun tube, fused or deformed; the gun tube is split or longitudinally cut; the gun mount or cradle is ruptured so as to 
be unable to mount a gun tube; and damage is caused to the running gear so that at least one of the road wheel stations is 
destroyed.
4.  Procedure for destruction by deformation:
(A)  Removal of special equipment from the chassis, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of on-board 
armament systems;
(B)  Removal of the turret, if any;
(C)  For the gun breech system, either:
(1)  Welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; or
(2)  Cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block;
(D)  Severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring;
(E)  Severing of either of the gun trunnions; and
(F)  The hull and turret shall be deformed so that their widths are each reduced by at least 20 percent.
5.  Procedure for destruction by smashing:
(A)  A heavy steel wrecking ball, or the equivalent, shall be dropped repeatedly onto the hull and turret until the hull is cracked in at 
least three separate places and the turret in at least one place;
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(B)  The hits of the ball on the turret shall render either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount inoperative, and deform visibly the 
breech ring; and
(C)  The gun tube shall be visibly cracked or bent.
SECTION IV. PROCEDURES FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES BY DESTRUCTION
1.  Each State Party shall have the right to choose any of the following sets of procedures each time it carries out the destruction of 
armoured combat vehicles at reduction sites.
2.  Procedure for destruction by severing:
(A)  For all armoured combat vehicles, removal of special equipment from the chassis, including detachable equipment, that ensures 
the operation of on-board armament systems;
(B)  For tracked armoured combat vehicles, severing of sections from both sides of the hull which include the final drive apertures, by 
vertical and horizontal cuts in the side plates and diagonal cuts in the deck or belly plates and front or rear plates, so that the final 
drive apertures are contained in the severed portions;
(C)  For wheeled armoured combat vehicles, severing of sections from both sides of the hull which include the front wheel final gearbox 
mounting areas by vertical, horizontal and irregular cuts in the side, front, deck and belly plates so that the front wheel final 
gearbox mounting areas are included in the severed portions at a distance of no less than 100 millimetres from the cuts; and
(D)  In addition, for armoured infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles:
(1)  Removal of the turret;
(2)  Severing of either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount in the turret;
(3)  For the gun breech system:
(a)  Welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places;
(b)  Cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block; or
(c)  Severing of the breech casing into two approximately equal parts;
(4)  Severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring; and
(5)  Severing of two sections from the perimeter of the hull turret aperture, each constituting a portion of a sector with an 
angle of no less than 60 degrees and, at a minimum, 200 millimetres in radial axis, centred on the longitudinal axis of the 
vehicle.
3.  Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition:
(A)  An explosive charge shall be placed on the interior floor at the mid-point of the vehicle;
(B)  A second explosive charge shall be placed as follows:
(1)  For heavy armament combat vehicles, inside the gun where the trunnions connect to the gun mount or cradle;
(2)  For armoured infantry fighting vehicles, on the exterior of the receiver/breech area and lower barrel group;
(C)  All hatches shall be secured; and
(D)  The charges shall be detonated simultaneously so as to split the sides and top of the hull. For heavy armament combat vehicles 
and armoured infantry fighting vehicles, damage to the gun system shall be equivalent to that specified in paragraph 2, 
subparagraph (D) of this Section.
4.  Procedure for destruction by smashing:
(A)  A heavy steel wrecking ball, or the equivalent, shall be dropped repeatedly onto the hull and the turret, if any, until the hull is 
cracked in at least three separate places and the turret, if any, in one place;
(B)  In addition, for heavy armament combat vehicles:
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(1)  The hits of the ball on the turret shall render either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount inoperative, and shall 
deform visibly the breech ring; and
(2)  The gun tube shall be visibly cracked or bent.
SECTION V. PROCEDURES FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARTILLERY BY DESTRUCTION
1.  Each State Party shall have the right to choose any one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries out the destruction of 
guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers, multiple launch rocket systems or mortars at 
reduction sites.
2.  Procedure for destruction by severing of guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers, or 
mortars, that are not self-propelled:
(A)  Removal of special equipment, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of the gun, howitzer, artillery piece 
combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortar;
(B)  For the breech system, if any, of the gun, howitzer, artillery piece combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortar, 
either:
(1)  Welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; or
(2)  Cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block;
(C)  Severing of the tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring;
(D)  Severing of the left trunnion of the cradle and the mounting area of that trunnion in the upper carriage; and
(E)  Severing of the trails, or the base plate of the mortar, into two approximately equal parts.
3.  Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of guns, howitzers, or artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and 
howitzers that are not self-propelled:
(A)  Explosive charges shall be placed in the tube, on one cradle mount in the upper carriage and on the trails, and detonated so 
that:
(1)  The tube is split or longitudinally torn within 1.5 metres of the breech;
(2)  The breech block is torn off, deformed or partially melted;
(3)  The attachments between the tube and the breech ring and between one of the trunnions of the cradle and the upper 
carriage are destroyed or sufficiently damaged to make them further inoperative; and
(4)  The trails are separated into two approximately equal parts or sufficiently damaged to make them further inoperative.
4.  Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of mortars that are not self-propelled:
Explosive charges shall be placed in the mortar tube and on the base plate so that, when the charges are detonated, the mortar tube 
is ruptured in its lower half and the base plate is severed into two approximately equal parts.
5.  Procedure for destruction by deformation of mortars that are not self-propelled:
(A)  The mortar tube shall be visibly bent approximately at its mid-point; and
(B)  The base plate shall be bent approximately on the centreline at an angle of at least 45 degrees.
6.  Procedure for destruction by severing of self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and 
howitzers or mortars:
(A)  Removal of special equipment, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of the gun, howitzer, artillery piece 
combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortar;
(B)  For the breech system, if any, of the gun, howitzer, artillery piece combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortar, 
either:
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(1)  Welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; or
(2)  Cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block;
(C)  Severing of the tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring;
(D)  Severing of the left trunnion and trunnion mount; and
(E)  Severing of sections of both sides from the hull which include the final drive apertures, by vertical and horizontal cuts in the side 
plates and diagonal cuts in the deck or belly plates and front or rear plates, so that the final drive apertures are contained in the 
severed portions.
7.  Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of 
guns and howitzers or mortars:
(A)  For self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortars with a turret: the 
method specified for battle tanks in Section III, paragraph 3 of this Protocol shall be applied in order to achieve results equivalent 
to those specified in that provision; and
(B)  For self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortars without a 
turret: an explosive charge shall be placed in the hull under the forward edge of the traversing deck that supports the tube, and 
detonated so as to separate the deck plate from the hull. For the destruction of the weapon system, the method specified for guns, 
howitzers, or artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers in paragraph 3 of this Section shall be applied 
in order to achieve results equivalent to those specified in that provision.
8.  Procedure for destruction by smashing of self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and 
howitzers or mortars:
(A)  A heavy steel wrecking ball, or the equivalent, shall be dropped repeatedly onto the hull and turret, if any, until the hull is cracked 
in at least three separate places and the turret in at least one place;
(B)  The hits of the ball on the turret shall render either of the trunnions and its trunnion mount inoperative, and deform visibly the 
breech ring; and
(C)  The tube shall be visibly cracked or bent at approximately its mid-point.
9.  Procedure for destruction by severing of multiple launch rocket systems:
(A)  Removal of special equipment from the multiple launch rocket system, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation 
of its combat systems; and
(B)  Removal of tubes or launch rails, screws (gears) of elevation mechanism sectors, tube bases or launch rail bases and their 
rotatable parts and severing them into two approximately equal parts in areas that are not assembly joints.
10.  Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of multiple launch rocket systems:
A linear shaped charge shall be placed across the tubes or launcher rails, and tube or launcher rail bases. When detonated, the charge 
shall sever the tubes or launcher rails, tube or launcher rail bases and their rotatable parts, into two approximately equal parts in areas 
that are not assembly joints.
11.  Procedure for destruction by deformation of multiple launch rocket systems:
All tubes or launcher rails, tube or launcher rail bases and the sighting system shall be visibly bent at approximately the mid-point.
SECTION VI. PROCEDURES FOR THE REDUCTION OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT BY DESTRUCTION
1.  Each State Party shall have the right to choose any one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries out the destruction of 
combat aircraft at reduction sites.
2.  Procedure for destruction by severing:
The fuselage of the aircraft shall be divided into three parts not on assembly joints by severing its nose immediately forward of the 
cockpit and its tail in the central wing section area so that assembly joints, if there are any in the areas to be severed, shall be contained 
in the severed portions.
3.  Procedure for destruction by deformation:
The fuselage shall be deformed throughout by compression, so that its height, width or length is reduced by at least 30 percent.
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4.  Procedure for destruction by use as target drones:
(A)  Each State Party shall have the right to reduce by use as target drones no more than 200 combat aircraft during the 40-month 
reduction period;
(B)  The target drone shall be destroyed in flight by munitions fired by the armed forces of the State Party owning the target drone;
(C)  If the attempt to shoot down the target drone fails and it is subsequently destroyed by a self-destruct mechanism, the procedures 
of this paragraph shall continue to apply. Otherwise the target drone may be recovered or may be claimed destroyed by accident 
in accordance with Section IX of this Protocol, depending on the circumstances; and
(D)  Notification of destruction shall be made to all other States Parties. Such notification shall include the type of the destroyed target 
drone and the location where it was destroyed. Within 90 days of the notification, the State Party claiming such reduction shall 
send documentary evidence, such as a report of the investigation, to all other States Parties. In the event of ambiguities relating 
to the destruction of a particular target drone, reduction shall not be considered complete until final resolution of the matter.
SECTION VII. PROCEDURES FOR THE REDUCTION OF ATTACK HELICOPTERS BY DESTRUCTION
1.  Each State Party shall have the right to choose any one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries out the destruction of 
attack helicopters at reduction sites.
2.  Procedure for destruction by severing:
(A)  The tail boom or tail part shall be severed from the fuselage so that the assembly joint is contained in the severed portion; and
(B)  At least two transmission mounts on the fuselage shall be severed, fused or deformed.
3.  Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition:
Any type and number of explosives may be used so that, at a minimum, after detonation the fuselage is cut into two pieces through that 
section of the fuselage that contains the transmission mounting area.
4.  Procedure for destruction by deformation:
The fuselage shall be deformed throughout by compression so that its height, width or length is reduced by at least 30 percent.
SECTION VIII. RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY 
BY CONVERSION FOR NON-MILITARY PURPOSES
1.  Each State Party shall have the right to reduce a certain number of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles by conversion. The types 
of vehicles that may be converted are listed in paragraph 3 of this Section and the specific non-military purposes for which they may be 
converted are listed in paragraph 4 of this Section. Converted vehicles shall not be placed in service with the conventional armed forces 
of a State Party.
2.  Each State Party shall determine the number of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles it will convert. This number shall not 
exceed:
(A)  For battle tanks, 5.7 percent (not to exceed 750 battle tanks) of the national ceiling established for that State Party in the Protocol 
on National Ceilings, or 150 items, whichever is greater; and
(B)  For armoured combat vehicles, 15 percent (not to exceed 3,000 armoured combat vehicles) of the national ceiling established for 
that State Party in the Protocol on National Ceilings, or 150 items, whichever is greater.
3.  The following vehicles may be converted for non-military purposes: T-54, T-55, T-62, T-64, T-72, Leopard 1, BMP-1, BTR-60, OT-64. The 
States Parties, within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, may make changes to the list of vehicles which may be converted 
to non-military purposes. Such changes, pursuant to Article XVI, paragraph 5 of the Treaty shall be deemed improvements to the 
viability and effectiveness of the Treaty relating only to minor matters of a technical nature.
4.  Such vehicles shall be converted for the following specific non-military purposes:
(A)  General purpose prime movers;
(B)  Bulldozers;
(C)  Fire fighting vehicles;
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(D)  Cranes;
(E)  Power unit vehicles;
(F)  Mineral fine crushing vehicles;
(G)  Quarry vehicles;
(H)  Rescue vehicles;
(I)  Casualty evacuation vehicles;
(J)  Transportation vehicles;
(K)  Oil rig vehicles;
(L)  Oil and chemical product spill cleaning vehicles;
(M)  Tracked ice breaking prime movers;
(N)  Environmental vehicles.
The States Parties, within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, may make changes to the list of specific non-military purposes. Such 
changes, pursuant to Article XVI, paragraph 5 of the Treaty shall be deemed improvements to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty 
relating only to minor matters of a technical nature.
5.  On entry into force of the Treaty, each State Party shall notify to all other States Parties the number of battle tanks and armoured 
combat vehicles that it plans to convert in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. Notification of a State Party’s intention to carry 
out conversion in accordance with this Section shall be given to all other States Parties at least 15 days in advance in accordance with 
Section X, paragraph 5 of the Protocol on Inspection. It shall specify the number and types of vehicles to be converted, the starting date 
and completion date of conversion, as well as the specific non-military purpose vehicles to emerge after conversion.
6.  The following procedures shall be carried out before conversion of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles at reduction sites:
(A)  For battle tanks:
(1)  Removal of special equipment from the chassis, including detachable equipment, that ensures the operation of on-board 
armament systems;
(2)  Removal of the turret, if any;
(3)  For the gun breech system, either:
(a)  Welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places; or
(b)  Cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block;
(4)  Severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring;
(5)  Severing of either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount in the turret; and
(6)  Cutting out and removal of a portion of the hull top armour beginning from the front glacis to the middle of the hull 
turret aperture, together with the associated portions of the side armour at a height of no less than 200 millimetres 
(for the T-64 and T-72, no less than 100 millimetres) below the level of the hull top armour, as well as the associated 
portion of the front glacis plate severed at the same height. The severed portion of this front glacis plate shall consist 
of no less than the upper third; and
(B)  For armoured combat vehicles:
(1)  For all armoured combat vehicles, removal of special equipment from the chassis, including detachable equipment, that 
ensures the operation of on-board armament systems;
(2)  For rear-engined vehicles, cutting out and removal of a portion of the hull top armour from the front glacis to the bulkhead 
of the engine-transmission compartment, together with the associated portions of the side and front armour at a height of 
no less than 300 millimetres below the level of the top of the assault crew compartment;
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(3)  For front-engined vehicles, cutting out and removal of a portion of the hull top armour plate from the bulkhead of the engine-
transmission compartment to the rear of the vehicle, together with the associated portions of the side armour at a height of 
no less than 300 millimetres below the level of the top of the assault crew compartment; and
(4)  In addition, for armoured infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles:
(a)  Removal of the turret;
(b)  Severing of either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount in the turret;
(c)  For the gun breech system:
(i)  Welding the breech block to the breech ring in at least two places;
(ii)  Cutting of at least one side of the breech ring along the long axis of the cavity that receives the breech block; or 
(iii)  Severing of the breech casing into two approximately equal parts; and
(d)  Severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring.
7.  Battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles being reduced pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section shall be subject to inspection, 
without right of refusal, in accordance with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection. Battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles shall 
be deemed reduced upon completion of the procedures specified in paragraph 6 of this Section and notification in accordance with 
Section X of the Protocol on Inspection.
8.  Vehicles reduced pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Section shall remain subject to notification pursuant to Section IV of the Protocol on 
Information Exchange until final conversion for non-military purposes has been completed and notification has been made in accordance 
with Section X, paragraph 12 of the Protocol on Inspection.
9.  Vehicles undergoing final conversion for non-military purposes shall also be subject to inspection in accordance with Section X of the 
Protocol on Inspection, with the following changes:
(A)  The process of final conversion at a reduction site shall not be subject to inspection; and
(B)  All other States Parties shall have the right to inspect fully converted vehicles, without right of refusal, upon receipt of a notification 
from the State Party conducting final conversion specifying when final conversion procedures will be completed.
10.  If, having completed the procedures specified in paragraph 6 of this Section on a given vehicle, it is decided not to proceed with final 
conversion, then the vehicle shall be destroyed in accordance with the appropriate procedures set forth elsewhere in this Protocol.
Had`i Milentijeva 31, 11 000 Belgrade, Serbia
Tel. (+381) (11) 344 6353  / Fax. (+381) (11) 344 6356
 URL: www.seesac.org / Email: info@seesac.org
SEESAC
Defence Conversion - 
The Disposal and Demilitarization 
of Heavy Weapon Systems
9 7 8 8 6 7 7 2 8 0 1 4 7
ISBN 86 -7728 -014 -6
South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse 
for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse
for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Adrian Wilkinson
